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Abstract
Smart contracting protocols promise to regulate the transfer
of cryptocurrency amongst participants in a trustless manner.
A safe smart contract implementation should ensure that each
participant can always append a contract transaction to the
blockchain in order move the contract towards secure comple-
tion. To this goal, we propose Bitcoin Trace-Net, a contract
verification framework which generates an executable
symbolic model from the underlying contract implementation.
A Trace-Net model consists of a Petri Net formalism enriched
with a Dolev-Yao-like actor knowledge model. The explicit
symbolic actor knowledge model supports the verification
of contracts featuring cryptographic sub-protocols, which
may not be observable on the blockchain. Trace-Net is
sufficiently expressive to accurately model blockchain
semantics such as the delay between a transaction broadcast
and its subsequent confirmation, as well as adversarial
blockchain reorganizations of finite depths, both of which
can break smart contract safety. As an implementation level
framework, Trace-Net can be instantiated at run-time to
monitor and verify smart contract protocol executions.
Keywords: Bitcoin; smart contracts; symbolic analy-
sis; model checking
1 Introduction
The term "Smart contracts" is commonly attributed to Nick
Szabo [1], who is known for his early work on digital cash and
digital contracts. Smart contracts promise contract implemen-
tations between actors to be executed in a trustless manner
without reliance on any trusted intermediaries. To this goal,
blockchain protocols offer both permissionless execution and
immutability of transactions. These properties promise the
realization of trustless smart contracts which are safely ex-
ecutable by any contract participant and robust against any
adversarial actions by counter-parties. More formally, we are
interested in verifying contracts for execution traces which
lead to safe outcomes. If the state space of the contract is
finite, such a safety notion expressed as a trace property is
decidable. In practice, many smart contracts are implemented
in general-purpose Turing-complete languages and thus can-
not be definitively verified for trustless execution. Instead,
substantial attention has been directed towards the analysis
of vulnerability patterns [2] on more expressive contracting
platforms such as Ethereum. Static analysis of smart contracts
to avoid vulnerability patterns [3] can be highly effective in
finding bugs. However they cannot prove the absence of any
unintentional contract behaviour and therefore cannot fully
deliver on the original promise of trustless smart contract
execution.
Contracts implemented in Bitcoin are famously Turing-
incomplete and feature finite state-spaces due to its limited
expressiveness of the underlying Script language. Bitcoin as
a contracting platform therefore lends itself to verification
with model-checking approaches. This has been thoroughly
investigated by Bartoletti & Zunino with BitML [4] [5] [6] [7]
[8], a higher-level contract specification language for Bitcoin
which compiles to Bitcoin transactions, appendable to the Bit-
coin blockchain by the contracting participants. BitML can
be symbolically executed at the language level and provides
safe compiler guarantees so that honest actors can always
move the specified contract forward during execution: This is
a big step towards secure smart contract development since
safety properties can be guaranteed at design time. How-
ever, contract specification languages at a higher abstraction
level come at the cost of expressiveness when compared to
designing contracts at the raw Bitcoin transaction level: Im-
plementing smart contracts directly at the computational level
is unwieldy, can also enable optimizations for higher on-chain
privacy or lower execution costs. For contracting protocols
such as atomic swaps [9], lightning [10] or state-channels
[11], where on-chain transaction privacy or cost efficiency are
paramount, BitML may not be the appropriate implementa-
tion and verification tool.
Instead, Trace-Net is intended as an implementation level
verification framework. As such, we also emphasize the need
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to accurately model blockchain semantics such as the delay
between a transaction broadcast and its confirmation as well
as possible blockchain reorganizations [12] [13] executed by
the adversary, both of which can break the security of a smart
contract design. Recent protocol specification errors in the Bit-
coin Lightning [14] protocol, for example, also indicate that
the verification of contracts developed at the Bitcoin imple-
mentation level remain an open challenge. Bitcoin contracting
protocols have been verified with cryptographic frameworks
[15], but manual security proofs cannot be automated for dif-
ferent contract designs.
Contributions We introduce Trace-Net as an automated
contract verification framework applicable at the the transac-
tion level of UTXO-based blockchain protocols. Trace-Net
generates an executable contract model from the symbolic ex-
ecution of unsigned transactions implementing an interactive
contract protocol: This symbolic contract model consists of an
extended Petri Net formalism representing on-chain contract
states and an extensible Dolev-Yao-like [16] actor knowledge
model, which expresses the actor’s ability to derive knowledge
from observations and publicly known cryptographic func-
tions. Modeling actor knowledge explicitly allows Trace-Net
to be extended with additional cryptographic sub-protocols
which may be unobservable on-chain, such as adaptor sig-
natures [11] and can therefore support a wide range of con-
tract protocol designs. Furthermore, separate modeling of
on-chain and actor knowledge states enable Trace-Net to ex-
press blockchain reorganizations which may occur during con-
tract execution: Such an event will reorder transactions whilst
retaining the states of each actor’s knowledge. Blockchain
reoganizations can frequently occur on blockchains with less
security and contracts may need to be verified against such
events. To the best of our knowledge, Trace-Net is the first
automated approach enabling the verification of safety proper-
ties in the presence of adversarial blockchain reorganizations.
The Trace-Net contract model is unfolded into a finite-state
transition system, for which temporal properties are decid-
able: In particular we introduce a formalisation of the trustless
execution property, which intuitively holds true if a contract
can be safely terminated by the verifying agent despite any
adversarial strategies executed by the counter-party. The posi-
tive verification of the trustless execution property results in
the identification of all safe strategies for the verifying actor,
which can be enforced at run-time. The verification of this
property can be extended to determine the safety of contract
updates which may occur during contract execution. Further-
more, we introduce the formal notion of contract stability,
which describes the safety of remaining in an intermediary,
non-terminal contract state: This is a useful notion for the ver-
ification of off-chain contracts such as state-channels, where
the termination of a live contract protocol is deferred so that
it can be updated at a later point in time.
We believe Trace-Net introduces the following promising
implications: Firstly, given a higher level specification of the
contract, Trace-Net can be instantiated to ensure implemen-
tation correctness, by verifying that trace properties of the
specification are also present at the implementation level. Of
course, a contract protocol can also be verified against general
safety policies expressed as temporal, trace properties, such as
trustless execution and contract stability. Thirdly, the ability
to perform automated verification at run-time can be useful for
monitoring contract protocol executions. Dedicated key man-
agement systems in secure execution environments tasked
with the secure signing of transactions could enforce univer-
sal safety policies at signing-time: Otherwise, safe signing
approaches must rely on contract-specific transaction pattern
matching [17] which cannot be generalized to other contract
types and cannot formally guarantee any contract safety prop-
erties.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In section 2 we summarize existing work relevant to our solu-
tion but also provide a wider overview of approaches to formal
correctness in smart contract design. In section 3 we intro-
duce our model of Bitcoin transactions and their symbolic
execution. Subsequently, the Trace-Net framework (section 4)
is introduced which consists of actor knowledge models (4.1,
4.1.1) and an on-chain Petri Net 4.2 formalism derived from
the previous symbolic execution of the underlying transac-
tions. Finally, sections 5 and 6 are dedicated to the automated
generation and analysis of the Trace-Net model for security
properties such as trustless execution, contract update safety
and contract state stability.
2 Related Work
Efforts to provide correctness guarantees in smart contracts
inherently face trace-offs between the expressiveness of the
implementation language and the decidability of the security
properties of interest. In this section, we aim to provide a
brief overview of the spectrum of formal frameworks and
languages intended to ensure contract correctness and safety.
Analysis of Bitcoin Script The Bitcoin Script language is
non-Turing-complete and often used as an implementation
language for various contracting protocols such as atomic
swaps [9], coin join [18] variants, payment channel networks
[10], generalized state channels [11] and other contract de-
signs surveyed by past literature [19]. However, even though
the limited expressiveness of Bitcoin Script is often claimed
to facilitate the manual investigation of its behaviour, only
a fragment of its language has been formalized (Klomp &
Bracciali [20]), which makes symbolic execution and formal
verification of Bitcoin Script challenging. Miniscript [21] [22]
[23] is a practical framework that enables symbolic execu-
tion of composable Bitcoin Script fragments, and is used by
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Trace-Net to lift a symbolic model from raw contract transac-
tions. We note, however, that it is ultimately difficult to reason
about the correctness of Miniscript given that the underly-
ing Bitcoin Script semantics are only informally described.
Nonetheless, developing contracts at the Bitcoin Script and
transaction level provides the flexibility of optimizing the
on-chain footprint for privacy and reduced execution cost.
Contracts as Cryptographic Protocols Analysis of indi-
vidual Bitcoin output scripts remains insufficient to reason
about the execution of interactive Bitcoin contracts imple-
mented over multiple transactions. The cryptography commu-
nity has successfully instantiated the Universal Composability
[15] framework to manually prove the security of interactive
contracts designs [24] [11]. Alternatively, Andrychowicz et
al. have proposed to model contract participants as timed
automata [25] executing an interactive protocol, such that
possible contract executions can be exhaustively explored
in a model checker such as UPPAAL. This latter approach,
however, still requires a contract model to manually specified.
Trace-Net builds upon past work on both symbolic Bitcoin
Script execution and the treatment of Bitcoin contracts as
interactive, cryptographic protocols and offers the ability to
automatically generate a symbolic, executable model from
raw transactions.
FSM Contract Languages BitML by Bartoletti and
Zunino [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] is a high-level contracting language
for Bitcoin which features safe execution guarantees provided
by compiler semantics. BitML is an elegant process algebra
intended for the implementation of smart contracts, but can
also be executed at the symbolic language level, providing
the contract designer a secure tool to ensure design intent
and contract implementation are in agreement. Furthermore,
executable BitML expressions are highly amenable to the
verification of general safety properties, such as liquidity [7],
which ensures that funds are never locked inside a contract
design. Because the symbolic execution of BitML expres-
sions can always be unfolded into a finite state transition
system, we denote BitML as a FSM contract language, over
which temporal properties are decidable. The higher level
BitML abstraction and its security guarantees come at the
cost of reduced control of the resulting on-chain footprint
during contract execution, which may affect its usefulness in
applications which emphasize on-chain privacy or execution
cost.
We note that general-purpose Turing-complete languages
such as Solidity can also be represented in FSM-like form,
making it amenable to verification. FSolidM by Mavridou
and Laszka [26] [27] [28] is a high-level contract language
which translates to Solidity. FSolidM is an adapted form of the
Behaviour, Interaction and Priority (BIP) framework [29] and
aims to introduce rigorous control state and contact execution
transition semantics. This has the potential of making the
verification of some safety properties decidable, in particular
temporal properties over user-defined control states using
symbolic execution and predicate abstraction techniques.
Typed Functional Languages Strong typing systems can
enforce the absence of many generalized vulnerability pat-
terns. Furthermore, functional languages lend themselves to-
wards translation into theorem proving frameworks, where
assisted proofs for contract properties can be performed.
Simplicity by O’Connor [30] is a typed functional contract
language intended for UTXO-blockchains such as Bitcoin,
with execution semantics formalized in Coq. Scilla [31] [32]
draws inspiration from both functional and automata-based
languages, but ultimately represents a functional language
with an adaptor to Coq. Importantly, Scilla implements inter-
contract communication as functions without side-effects: A
contract in an account-based blockchain platform can only
call an external contract at the very end of a function execu-
tion, so that no external effects are possible in the midst of a
function, thereby preventing reentrancy [19] vulnerabilities
and also facilitating the implementation of inter-blockchain
contract messaging in sharded blockchains.
Detection of Vulnerability Patterns Both static analysis
[33] [34] [35] [36] and theorem proving approaches [37] [38]
[39] [40] have been successfully deployed to detect gener-
alized vulnerabilities previously exploited on the Ethereum
blockchain. Vulnerability patterns frequently arise when there
is a mismatch between the intuition of the developer and
the underlying execution semantics of the blockchain. In
Ethereum, common vulnerability patterns include the reen-
trancy [2] problem, transaction ordering, block timestamp
dependency, call stack depth limitation, unchecked send and
suicidal contracts [41]. Static analysis tools however, cannot
guarantee the absence of bugs, nor can they guarantee con-
tract safety, although VerX [35] has demonstrated decidability
of contract-specific temporal properties for a fragment of the
EVM language.
Domain-specific Contract Languages Finally, we note
that domain-specific contracting languages have been pro-
posed for specific contract archetypes. The financial contract
language from Bahr et al. [42], for example, provides very sim-
ple expressions for traditional financial contracts formalized
by Peyton et al. [43]. These include foreign exchange swaps
and options, credit default swaps, and portfolios holding con-
tracts with multiple counter-parties. Marlowe [44] provides a
language to compile such contract types à Peyton et al. to the
Cardano blockchain run-time. “Trustless” contract execution
of such contracts is guaranteed by the execution framework
[45] targeting the EVM run-time, though formalized com-
piler semantics do not exist to the best of our knowledge.
Findel [46] is another DSL for financial derivatives executed
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on Ethereum. We presume that additional domain-specific
contracting languages will emerge as blockchain platforms
and smart contract applications mature.
3 Symbolic Execution of Bitcoin Transactions
We begin this section with a simplified model of Bitcoin trans-
actions and their general execution for the general reader. In
the subsequent section 3.1, we introduce the symbolic exe-
cution of transaction scripts with Miniscript semantics (3.2),
resulting in symbolic execution paths for each transaction out-
put. Section 3.3 outlines accurate transaction confirmation on
the blockchain, which requires finite delays between the ini-
tial transaction broadcast and its inclusion in the blockchain:
We do not model transaction confirmations as final, but ac-
count for a possibility of blockchain reorganizations of finite
depths by an adversarial actor.
Transaction Anatomy A Bitcoin transaction consists of
the attribute tuple (tx.id, tx. ~ins, tx. ~outs, tx.after), where ~ins
and ~outs are input and output vectors respectively. Trans-
action outputs represent funds which are spendable. A single
transaction input always refers to a single output of a previous
transaction in the blockchain, thereby forwarding or spending
its value to outputs of the spending transaction (figure 1).
The tx.id attibute is unique to each transaction and is ob-
tained by hashing the transaction byte string in network se-
rialization form which encodes the inputs, outputs and after
attributes. The tx.after transaction attribute encodes a transac-
tion level time-lock and is detailed in the subsequent transac-
tion time-locks paragraph.
Each input in a Bitcoin transaction is represented by an at-
tribute tuple (in.prevout, in.witness, in.older). The in.prevout
attribute uniquely references the redeemed output in an
output vector of a previously confirmed transaction with
a (txid, index) pair. The witness encodes input arguments
which satisfy the script of the output it spends.
An output is described with the attribute tuple
(out.value,out.script). The difference between the sum
of the output values of a transaction and the value sum of the
output referenced by the transaction inputs is denoted the
f ee which is rewarded to the miner of the block. An output
script is a string of operators and is only executed during the
validation of a spending transaction, with the spending input
witness providing the input arguments to the script execution.
This is detailed in the following paragraph.
Spending of Outputs Transactions in Bitcoin are intended
to transfer the ownership of output values from one partici-
pant to another which requires a global ordering of all trans-
actions. Although transactions are grouped in "blocks" in the
blockchain, the ordering of all transactions in the blockchain
is total. An output can only be redeemed or "spent" by a single
script
A
0.1 btc
TXID
C
After: 49
witness
A
TXID
0
/1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
older: 2
older: 15
script
B
0.2 btc
script
...
...
script
...
...
script
C
0.29 btc
witness
B
TXID
1
/0
TXID
B
After: 30
TXID
A
TXID
A
amended in block 46
TXID
C
time-locked until block 50
TXID
B
amended in block 35
After: 45
Figure 1: Transaction C (T XIDC) spends outputs at indices
1 & 0 from transactions A & B respectively. Transaction C
is time-locked until blockheight 50 since it is limited by the
older time-lock of input 1: Note that the older time-lock of
input 0 in transaction C releases earlier at blockheight of 48.
input of a transaction ordered thereafter. An output from a
confirmed transaction which is not yet redeemed is denoted
an unspent transaction output, or UTXO.
In order for a transaction to be valid, all its inputs must
contain witnesses which satisfy conditions expressed in the
output script being spent. When a newly broadcast transaction
is verified, all scripts of each output it redeems are executed
against the respective input witnesses to ensure correct satis-
faction. A successful spend of an output requires the script
to complete without run-time errors and the script stack to
contain an non-zero value stored in the top stack element.
An illustrative output script (in.prevout.script) and input
witness (in.witness) pair are shown below. Note that the wit-
ness is copied element-by-element (w0,w1, ...,wm) into an
in-memory execution stack (stackinit ) before the script valida-
tion run is performed.
script = [OP0,
OP1,
...,
OPn ]
witness, stackinit = [w0,
w1,
...,
wm ]
The script is executed opcode-by-opcode beginning with its
first operator OP0 and stackinit until OPn has been completed.
Operator types can read, write or delete the upper region
of the script stack. Alternatively, some operator types will
perform control flow. Once OPn is completed, the resulting
top stack element must be non-zero for the script evaluation
to be successful, thereby validating the input witness under
consideration.
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Transaction Time-locks In aggregate, the transaction time-
locks at the input and transaction levels result in an earliest
possible broadcast time for a given transaction. The earliest
broadcast time is the blockheight at which all after and older
time-locks in a transaction have released and the transaction
can be broadcast and amended to the blockchain.
Older time-locks are encoded at the transaction level, and
encode an absolute time until which the transaction is time-
locked. For example, transaction A in figure 1 is time-locked
until blockheight 45.
After time-locks are encoded in each transaction input,
which enforces a minimum age of the output being spent.
In figure 1, for example, input 0 of transaction C encodes
an after time-lock of 2 blocks, which requires transaction A
to be at least 2 blocks old when transaction C is broadcast:
This time-lock releases at the blockheight 46+2 = 48, since
transaction A was amended in block 46.
The earliest firing time of a transaction occurs when all
after and older time-locks have released. The After time-lock
of transaction C in figure 1 releases at blockheight 49, and the
older time-locks at 48 and 50 respectively, given the age of the
previous outputs. As a result, the effective earliest broadcast
time of transaction C is blockheight 50.
3.1 Symbolic Script Execution
In order to establish an executable, symbolic model of contract
transactions, we must be able to perform a symbolic execu-
tion of each transaction output script. The intended purpose
of an output script is to encode spending conditions, which
must be satisfied by the witness of a valid transaction input.
A more detailed description of Bitcoin script instruction set
semantics can be found in [47] or in the Bitcoin Core source
code [48]. Most importantly, a Bitcoin script encodes a finite
set of execution paths γ= γ0∨ ...∨ γn. Each output execution
path implies a unique set of constraints on the spending input
witness, which can be obtained from the symbolic execution
of the output script. We have previously noted that symbolic
execution is only possible for a fragment of Script [20] and re-
mains an open challenge. Nonetheless, we illustrate symbolic
script execution with Miniscript in section 3.2 which relies
on an informal definition of the underlying Bitcoin script
fragment semantics.
Definition 3.1 (Symbolic Witness) A symbolic witness Γ is a
unique set of constraints imposed on the individual elements
of the spending input witness by an output script. Any input
witness which satisfies Γ is a valid input witness.
The following relationship between an input witness w and
a symbolic witness Γ holds true if the witness satisfies the
constraints imposed by the symbolic witness.
w |= Γ
Furthermore, we can define a symbolic execution function
sat(out put) which returns a set of symbolic witnesses Γ¯ con-
taining the n alternative script exection paths γ0∨ ...∨ γn of
the output script.
sat(out put) = Γ¯= {Γ0, ...,Γn}
For simplicity, we denote sat(in) to mean sat(in.prevout),
which returns the symbolic witnesses of the output being
spent by in. In order to express symbolic witnesses, we adapt
and simplify the constraint expressions introduced in [20].
In particular, we wish to describe an input witness stack
(w0,w1, ...,wn) in terms of constraints imposed on each of
its elements. The following set C of constraint expressions
consists of symbolic witness stack elements w j, constant byte
strings b, constant integers i, relational operators and func-
tional expressions such as signature, hash and size:
exp ::= exp∧ exp | sig w j pk | hash w j = b32,20 | size w j = i |
w j = b | a f ter >= i | older >= i
(1)
The symbolic expression sig w0 pkA, for example, constrains
the first witness stack element (w0) to be a valid signature
of the transaction signed by the private key inv(pkA). The
expression hash w1 = b32 constrains the second witness stack
element to be the hash pre-image of the 32-byte constant b32.
The time-lock constraint older >= i in C constrains the value
of the in.older attribute and not the witness element directly1.
The a f ter >= i time-lock constraint is imposed on the spend-
ing transactions tx.after attribute. Example 3.2 illustrates a
symbolic witness composed of symbolic expressions from C
for a hash time-lock contract. Our simplified set of constraint
expressions can only express symbolic execution of a subset
of Bitcoin Script, but it is nonetheless sufficiently expressive
to describe symbolic execution of Miniscript, which in turn
can implement many commonly deployed Bitcoin contracting
protocols [9] [18] [10], [11].
We proceed to denote several definitions which can be
derived from the analysis of symbolic witnesses. Firstly, if
for a specific output execution path an actor can exclusively
generate a witness which satisfies the respective symbolic
witness, this output path is owned by the actor.
Definition 3.2 (Output Path Ownership) An output path is
owned by an actor if Γ ∈ sat(out put) and it only features
constraints which the actor can exclusively satisfy.
Such an execution path can be spent anytime by its owner.
Of course, the same output may feature alternative execution
paths spendable by other actors and thus have multiple owners.
1Since both older and a f ter attributes are committed to transaction sig-
natures, of which each transaction input witness generally requires at least
one, it can be argued that time-lock constraints older >= i and a f ter >= i
are witness constraints on signatures.
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If the actor can only exclusively produce the signatures of a
given output execution path, but does not have the required
knowledge to fulfill other non-signature witness constraints,
it won’t be able to move the funds. However, this actor still
maintains control over where the funds can be send for this
given output execution path, as the destination outputs are
committed by the actor signatures alone. An actor owns an
output if it owns all output execution paths.
Definition 3.3 (Output Path Control) An output execution
path is controlled by an actor, if it can exclusively satisfy all
signature expressions in the respective symbolic witnesses
in Γ ∈ Γ¯: An actor controlling an output path controls the
destination of the output funds when spending along that
specific output execution path.
We now consider the implications of a transaction spending
multiple unspent outputs which each feature multiple, alterna-
tive symbolic witnesses (|Γ¯i|> 1). The spending transaction
needs only to satisfy one symbolic witness per input , result-
ing in a combinatorial expansion of valid, unique witness sets
for the spending transaction.
Definition 3.4 (Symbolic Witness Permutation) Given a
transaction and its inputs (in0, in1,...), each with a possible set
of symbolic witnesses sat(ini) = Γ¯i = {Γ0,i,Γ1,i, ...}, multiple
permutations of valid witness sets are possible over this mul-
tiset of symbolic witnesses. A symbolic witness permutation
pii for a transaction tx is a unique combination of symbolic
witnesses for each tx input. Notation: pi(tx) = {pi0,pi1, ...} de-
notes all possible symbolic witness permutations for a given
transaction tx.
We conclude this section by illustrating the different script
execution paths of a commonly used script pattern called the
hash time-locked contract (HTLC).
Example 3.1 (Hash Time-locked Contract) The following
Bitcoin Script example has two different spending conditions
γ0∨ γ1, where γ0 is encumbered with a hash-lock and public
key pkA and γ0 is encumbered with a delay of 10 blocks and
the public key pkB. This script type is commonly referred to
as a Hash Time-locked Contract (HTLC), denoting the two
script execution paths.
1 <PK_A> OP_CHECKSIG
2 OP_NOTIF
3 <PK_B> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
4 <10> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
5 OP_ELSE
6 OP_SIZE <32> OP_EQUALVERIFY
7 OP_SHA256 <B_32> OP_EQUAL
8 OP_ENDIF
The first execution path γ0 requires a transaction signature
created with the private key inv(pkA) (line 1) and the sha256
preimage to the digest b32 (lines 6,7). Alternative execution
path γ1 can be spent with a transaction signature with the
private inv(pkB) (line 3) and a time delay of 10 blocks (line 4)
after the transaction featuring this script has been amended to
the blockchain. Symbolic witnesses Γ0 and Γ1 for γ0 and γ1
of this HTLC are expressed below with constraint expressions
(1) from C as follows:
Γ0 := [ sha256 w0 = b32,
sig w1 pkA ]
Γ1 := [ sig w0 pkB,
w1 = 0,
a f ter >= 10 ]
The symbolic witnesses provide the necessary information
for an actor to determine whether it can deduce a valid witness
for a Bitcoin Script from its knowledge. For example, an actor
with the knowledge of inv(pkA), the sha256 preimage of b32
and the symbolic witness Γ0, will be able to produce a two
element witness stack which satisfies Γ0 (or the execution
path γ0).
We have now defined symbolic witnesses which satisfy
specific output execution paths of a Bitcoin output script and
demonstrated this information can be used to generate a valid
input witness. As previously noted, there exists no full for-
malization of the Bitcoin script language to enable symbolic
execution of the entire Bitcoin Script language to the best of
our knowledge. For a subset of Script, Klomp and Bracciali
[20] have formalized the semantics of individual script op-
erations, so that the constraints expressions in the symbolic
witness can inferred step-wise during the symbolic execution
of each script command. Alternatively, we propose to make
use of the symbolic analysis framework which Miniscript
provides, which covers a useful fragment of Bitcoin Script.
3.2 Miniscript
This introductory section on Miniscript is not required for the
comprehension of Trace-Net and can be skipped by the reader,
but we include it nonetheless as Miniscript provides a useful
framework for symbolic execution of the underlying Script
fragments, with which a Trace-Net model can be instantiated.
Terms in the Miniscript language M each express a unique
Script template, consisting of one or more Script operations.
Terms are composable according to Miniscript semantics to
produce additional expressions, as shown in the first column
of table 1. The semantics of the underlying Bitcoin script(m)
of each Miniscript term m are captured by type(m) and type
modifier properties. We refer to [21] for a full description of
Miniscript and focus on a selected subset to illustrate its rele-
vance to Trace-Net. The script(m) column of table 1 includes
the Script fragments required to parse the raw Bitcoin Script
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Miniscript term m sat(m) dsat(m) script(m) type(m)
andor(mx,my,mz)
sat(my)+ sat(mx) ∨
sat(mz)+dsat(mx)
dsat(mz)+ sat(mx) ∨
dsat(my)+ sat(mx)
script(msx) NOT IF script(msz) ...
ELSE script(msy) ENDIF
type(my)
andv(mx,my) sat(my)+ sat(mx) dsaty + satx script(mx) script(my) type(my)
v(m) sat(mx) - script(mx)V ERIFY V
pk(bkey) [sig X0 pk] [X0 = 0] < bkey > CHECKSIG B
sha256(b32) [sha256 X0 = b32]
[size X0 = 32 ∧
sha256 X0! = b32]
SIZE < 32 > EQUALV ERIFY ...
SHA256 < b32 > EQUAL
B
older(i) [older >= i] [older < i] < i > CHECKSEQUENCEV ERIFY B
Table 1: An overview of selected Miniscript terms required to express the HTLC script template from example 3.1. Columns
sat(m) and dsat(m) denote satisfying and dissatisfying symbolic witnesses for the respective Miniscript term m. Both satisfying
and dissatisfying symbolic witnesses of child expressions are sometimes necessary for the satisfying witness(es) of the parent
Miniscript term.
from example 3.1 into the following Miniscript expression:
andor(
pkA,
sha256(b32),
andv(v(pkB),older(10))
)
(2)
Informally, the Miniscript term andor(mx,my,mz) implies
satisfaction expressed as (mx ∧my) ∨mz. The Miniscript
term andv(mx,my) requires the satisfaction of both subterms
(mx ∧my). Miniscript distinguishes between satisfying and
dissatisfying symbolic witnesses for a given Miniscript term
m: A dissatisfying symbolic witness provides an input to a
Script fragment which executes without a run-time error but
does not satisfy its specific execution path. A dissatisfying
witness of a Miniscript term is required for the composition of
Miniscript parent terms, where the satisfaction or dissatisfac-
tion of a child term may be required for the satisfaction of the
parent term. Importantly, however, the satisfying witnesses of
the parent Miniscript term can be expressed in terms of the
(dis)satisfying witnesses of its child terms, as shown in table
1.
We now illustrate how to construct symbolic witnesses for
our HTLC Miniscript (equation 2) with Miniscript semantics
shown in table 1. (Dis)satisfying symoblic witnesses for ter-
minal Miniscript subexpressions such as pkA,B, sha256(b32)
and older(10) are derived first:
sat(pkA,B) = [sig w0 pkA,B]
dsat(pkA,B) = [w0 = 0]
sat(sha256(b32)) = [sha256 w0 = b32]
sat(older(10)) = [older >= i]
At the next expression level, we derive the satisfying symbolic
witnesses of v(pkB) and subsequently andv(v(pkB),older(10)
by concatenation of the symbolic witnesses of the child terms
according to the (d)sat(m) columns of table 1.
sat(v(pkB)) = sat(pkB) = [sig X0 pkA,B]
sat(andv(v(pkB),older(10)) = sat(older(10))+ sat(v(pkB))
= [sig w0 pkB, older >= 10]
Finally, we can infer the symbolic witnesses Γ0 and Γ1 of
the top-level andor Minsicript expression representing our
HTLC script.
sat(andor(pkA, sha256(b32), andv(v(pkB), older(10)))
= sat(sha256(b32))+ sat(pkA) ∨
sat(andv(v(pkB), older(10)))+dsat(pkA)
= [sha256 w0 = b32, sig w1 pkA] ∨
[sig w0 pkB, w1 = 0, a f ter >= 10]
= Γ0 ∨ Γ1
We also note that Miniscript terms are typed and feature
type modifier properties, which capture the stack manipulation
behavior of the underlying Script fragments, to ensure correct
composition of terms: The Miniscript type B is called a base
expression, as it pushes a non-zero stack element to the stack
upon satisfaction. A V type, in contrast, does not add a stack
element upon satisfaction, which can be nonetheless useful as
a conditional expression in a parent Miniscript term. Further
details about the type and properties of Miniscript are defined
in [21].
Example 3.2 (Atomic Swap Contract with Miniscript) We
introduce a contract protocol called an atomic swap for which
we will step-wise instantiate the Trace-Net model for illustra-
tion purposes. The atomic swap protocol is intended for two
actors to exchange ownership of Bitcoin outputs. It features
HTLC scripts previously introduced in example 3.1.
A possible implementation of an atomic swap is shown in
figure 2. Its execution resembles a commit-protocol between
the two actors: First, Alice commits her coin to the contract.
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Figure 2: A set of contract transactions are shown which
stipulate an atomic swap contract between participants A and
B. Both transaction outputs feature alternative γswap and γabort
execution paths, whilst the identical hash-locks and staggered
time-locks enforce the exclusive execution of either swap or
abort paths for both parties.
If Bob responds in like, the coin swap can take place. If
Bob does not respond, Alice can withdraw her funds after the
expiration of a time-out. In our example implementation, each
funding contract transaction features a single output with an
HTLC. Both HTLC’s feature an identical hash-lock, which
functions as a proof of publication2. In Miniscript terms, these
two output scripts are expressed as follows:
HT LCA = andor(pkB,sha256(b32),
andv(v(pkA),older(15)))
HT LCB = andor(pkA,sha256(b32),
andv(v(pkB),older(10)))
For both scripts, let us denote the script execution path featur-
ing the hashlocks as the swap paths, because they finalize the
swap between participating actors. These output paths featur-
ing pkA or pkB are controlled by actors A and B respectively,
and the private keys for signing remain secret. Swap paths are
coupled by the shared hash-lock with a b32 secret pre-image
generated by a the initiating actor A. Subsequent paragraphs
demonstrate how the hash-lock can provide a verifiable pub-
lication proof for the swap transaction of the initiating actor.
2Once Alice executes her swap transaction, the proof of publication is
released on-chain, allowing Bob to execute his swap transaction as well.
This is required to ensure either both or none of the swap
paths are executed.
Contract Security Should the initiating actor A attempt to
obtain its swapped funds after both actors have committed
funds, the pre-image of this hash-lock will be revealed to actor
B upon its broadcast to the Bitcoin network, as a witness
element of the swap transaction. Having observed the hash-
lock preimage, actor B can now proceed to redeem its swap
transaction, thereby completing the contract. The hash-lock
therefore functions as a proof-of-publication, which performs
the "atomic" coupling between the two swap transactions.
Omitting the distinction between transaction broadcasts and
confirmations, a successful atomic swap initiated by Alice
has the following execution trace:
tx f und,A−−−−→ tx f und,B−−−−→ txswap,A−−−−→ txswap,B−−−−→ ◦
Should the Alice become unresponsive after
tx f und,A−−−−→ tx f und,B−−−−→,
actor B can wait until the time-lock on its funding transaction
output expires, releasing returning actor B’s committed funds.
Subsequently, with an additional delay, actor A too can regain
ownership of its original funds in this abort scenario.
tx f und,A−−−−→ tx f und,B−−−−→ d10−−→ txabort,B−−−−→ d5−→ txabort,A−−−−→ ◦
Note however, that unsafe contract execution traces are pos-
sible with this implementation. Consider the following trace,
for example:
tx f und,B−−−−→ txswap,A−−−−→ ◦
If Bob funds the contract first, its funds can be swept by actor
Alice who generated the secret pre-image and can execute
the swap path of HT LCB. Another subtle contract aspect are
the delays (∆TA, ∆TB) imposed on abort transactions txabort,A,
txabort,B. For a swap initiated by Alice, who generates the
secret pre-image, setting ∆TA = ∆TB will enable the following
contract execution trace:
tx f und,A−−−−→ tx f und,B−−−−→ d(∆TA/B)−−−−−→ txabort,A−−−−→ txswap,A−−−−→ ◦
This trace results in actor A obtaining ownership of both
utxo’s after executing both txswap,A and txabort,A, which is
clearly not the intent of the contract design. This unsafe
contract outcome is possible, since the time-locks can re-
lease simultaneously, enabling race conditions between swap
and abort paths: txswap,A/txabort,B and txswap,B/ txabort,A. In the
trace above, we assume the adversary will confirm its transac-
tions first and therefore win both races. A safe contract must
therefore be safe despite the possibility of competing trans-
actions. We can solve this by ensuring that ∆TA > ∆TB for
a swap contract initiated by Alice, who generates the secret
hash pre-image and must confirm a funding transaction first.
Having now considered several trace examples including
some which represent unintended contract executions, we pro-
ceed to formalize transaction confirmation semantics, which
describe how transactions are appended to the blockchain in
the Trace-Net model.
8
3.3 Transaction Confirmation Semantics
Transaction fees Trace-Net neglects transaction fees, and
assumes that these can be sufficiently adjusted without re-
signing after a transaction is broadcast according to client
implementation logics to ensure a transaction is appended to
the blockchain within a fixed duration.
Transaction confirmation delays We differentiate be-
tween transactions broadcast by the verifying actor and all
other, potentially adversarial external actors. The finite con-
firmation delays for the verifying internal and external actors
can be parameterized independently during contract verifi-
cation (section 5) to accurately reflect contract deployment
environments.
Adversarial Blockchain Reorganization Given that
smaller blockchains are often secured by minimal proof-of-
work [12] [13], the cost of performing a 51% attack and
reorganizing the blockchain can be low enough for attackers
to pursue. A reorganization allows the attacker to selectively
replace and inject transactions in the new chain branch and
re-execute the ongoing contract to its advantage. Trace-Net
models an adversarial blockchain reorganization at each
contract state, to ensure a smart contract safety property
will hold despite bounded reorganizations by an adversary
(section 5).
4 Trace-Net: A Symbolic Model of Contracts
Having covered the symbolic execution of Bitcoin transac-
tions, we can now proceed to detail how Trace-Net provides
a symbolic model of the entire contract execution. In addition
to symbolic analysis of individual output scripts, we must
provide a stateful contract model which captures both actor
knowledge and blockchain state relevant to the contract. This
symbolic contract model must be executable, featuring direct
messages exchanges, and on-chain events. We provide an
overview of the symbolic Trace-Net Model before defining
state transition semantics in subsequent subsections.
Internal & External Actors In our model of Bitcoin con-
tract protocols, each verifying actor will assume that all other
counter-parties are colluding against the verifying actor. We
can thereby simplify each contracting protocol as one between
two actors: The internal, verifying actor and the adversarial,
external actor. This implies that direct contract protocol mes-
saging can be modelled as single bi-directional communica-
tion channel between these two actors, with no additional
relevant intruders.
Actor Knowledge We model the actor knowledge states as
Kint ,Kext , consisting of symbolic knowledge objects such as
transaction templates and secrets. Actors always expand their
knowledge when it is updated with a direct message from the
counter-party or an observation on the blockchain. Knowl-
edge expansion is performed with a set of public functions Σ
available to all actors, modeling Dolev-Yao deductive abilities
of an actor during contract protocol execution (section 4.1).
Setup phase Each contract protocol implementation begins
with the generation of the contract transaction templates dur-
ing the setup phase. Transaction templates have fully defined
attributes, but feature empty witnesses, and can therefore not
be broadcast. We denote a transaction template as tx′ and a
completed, valid contract transaction with valid witnesses as
tx. Informally, the setup phase corresponds to the stipulation
of the contract for the participating actors. The setup in-
volves no exchanges of signatures or generated secrets. We
express the generation of the contract transaction templates as
a implementation-defined function GenTx, which, on an input
of public keys PK∗, hash digests B∗ and funding output sets
outs∗f , will output a set of contract transaction templates T X
′.
These required inputs to GenTx are defined by the contract
implementation, but require at least one public key and one
funding output in total.
GenTx(PKint ,PKext ,Bint ,Bext ,outsintf ,outs
ext
f ) = T X
′
Inputs to and output of GenTx are known by both internal
and external actors at the end of the setup phase. Actors have
access to the following public functions in Σsetup during the
setup phase:
Σsetup = (Gen, PK, Hash, GenTx) (3)
The function Gen is a from a Bitcoin supported signature
scheme Ξ = (Gen,Sign,Vrfy), PK the public key derivation
function and Hash a hash function supported by Bitcoin script.
For simplicity, actors call Gen to generate both private key
or hash pre-image secrets required for the public key and
hash inputs of GenTx. These secrets are added to the actors
knowledge during the setup phase: Once this is complete,
Trace-Net can be instantiated to symbolically execute the
contract and generate the reachable state-space for safety
verification.
Symbolic execution phase Trace-Net models a symbolic
contract state with the tuple (Kint ,Kext ,B), where K is the
state of an actor’s knowledge and B the on-chain state of the
contract Bitcoin transactions. In each protocol state during
the execution phase, the following transaction types can be
fired by the actors if the transitions are in a fireable state.
• e - Message exchange
• tb - Transaction broadcast
• t - On-chain confirmation
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• d - Time delay
• r - Blockchain reorganization
We provide an initial introduction to the transition types
and formally define both transition firing semantics in later
sections. For actor a,b ∈ {int,ext}:
(Ka,Kb,B)
ea−→ (Ka,K′b,B): A message exchange transition
is a direct message between internal and external actors, where
the knowledge of recipient is updated with the message object.
A message exchange transition only updates the knowledge
state of the receiving actor (definitions 4.2, 4.3).
(Ka,Kb,B)
tba−→ (Ka,K′b,B): When an actor intends to add
a valid transaction to the Bitcoin blockchain, the transaction
must first be broadcast to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network
with a transaction broadcast transition, fired by an actor who
can produce the transaction from knowledge. A broadcast is
only modeled in Trace-Net if it results in an update of the
counterparty’s knowledge (definitions 4.4, 4.5).
(Ka,Kb,B)
ta−→ (Ka,Kb,B′): An on-chain transaction can
only be confirmed or amended to the blockchain if it has
previously been broadcast or is already fully known by the
counterparty. An on-chain transition only updates the on-
chain contract state, and can be preceded by a time delay to
model the required confirmation time (definitions 4.12, 4.13).
(Ka,Kb,B)
d−→ (Ka,Kb,B′): A time delay interval is ex-
pressed in a number amended blocks and like an on-chain
transition only affects the on-chain state B (definition 4.10).
(Kint ,Kext ,B)
rext (n)−−−→ (Kint/K′int ,Kext ,B′): A blockchain re-
organization of depth n is fireable by the external actor at
any contract state. Since the external actor can freely deter-
mine the reorganization depth and transaction ordering of the
new chain branch, different reorganizations up to a maximum
depth are possible at a given state (definition 4.14, section 5).
Actor Strategies We refer to the set of fire-able transitions
of an actor as its strategies in contract state (Kint ,Kext ,B).
4.1 Actor Knowledge Derivation
Actor knowledge is modeled in a Dolev-Yao-fashion [16],
where each actor can access a set of public function to deduce
additional information during the symbolic execution of the
underlying contract implementation.
Definition 4.1 (Actor Knowledge) An actor knowledge K is
a finite set of transaction templates, private keys, public keys,
hash pre-images and signatures. K can be expanded with a set
of public functions Σexec during symbolic contract execution
whenever K is updated with external information.
Let k be a knowledge object which is derived from K with
a function in Σexec. We denote the knowledge expansion of K
with k with the following notation.
K ` k
The public functions Σexec allow actors to derive sweep trans-
action templates from outputs and transaction signatures from
private keys.
Σexec = (SweepTx,Sign) (4)
• SweepTx(out) is a function that generates a symbolic
sweep transaction template spending out, which features
an execution path controlled (definition 3.3) by a single
actor a ∈ {int,ext}. This sweep transaction sends the
funds to single output owned by actor a.
K ` out i f ctrl(out,actor)
K ` SweepTx(out,actor)
Where ctrl(out,actor) denotes that out features an exe-
cution path controlled by actor. K ` out if the output is
a member of any transaction template in the knowledge
of actor actor.
• Sign(tx′, inv(pk)) is a function that on input transac-
tion template tx′ and secret key inv(pk) outputs a sig-
nature sigpk(tx′). This signature satisfies the constraint
[sig w pk] as w.
K ` tx′ K ` inv(pk)
i f pk ∈ sat(tx′.ins)
K ` sign(tx′, inv(pk))
This derivation rule is applicable to all public keys fea-
tured in the symbolic witnesses of transaction template
inputs (pk in sat(tx′.ins)).
Bounded knowledge expansion with Σexec implies a finite
contract execution state-space. Inputs and outputs of public
functions SweepTx and Sign are typed, such that derived
knowledge cannot be used as an inputs to Σexec. SweepTx
consumes controlled outputs and produces owned outputs.
Likewise, signatures generated from the public Sign function
cannot be used as inputs for Σexec.
Example 4.1 (Initial Knowledge Expansion) In the follow-
ing example, we illustrate how the actor knowledge is ex-
panded at the beginning of the symbolic execution phase of
an atomic swap contract.
For our atomic swap example initiated by the internal actor,
the initial knowledge Kint of internal actor after the setup
phase executed by the contract implementation is initialized as
follows. Note that we do not explicitly list the funding outputs,
as these are already referenced as in.prevout attributes in
the funding transactions, which the actor can extract. For
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simplicity, we assume that actors reuse private keys for all
outputs.
Kint = {inv(pkint),b32, tx′f und,int , tx′f und,ext}
Subsequently, since tx′f und,int and tx
′
f und,ext contain the fund-
ing outputs as well as swap and abort output execution paths
which are all controlled by single actors, we can expand the in-
ternal actor’s knowledge with sweep transactions (SweepTx)
for all these output execution paths. These sweep transactions
(sweep, swap, abort) are depicted in figure 4.2.
Kint ` {tx′swap,int , tx′abort,int , tx′sweep,int ,
tx′swap,ext , tx
′
abort,ext , tx
′
sweep,ext ,
sigpkint (tx
′
f und,int), sigpkint (tx
′
swap,int),
sigpkint (tx
′
abort,in),sigpkint (tx
′
sweep,int)}
The internal actor furthermore can derive signatures which
are required to satisfy the the symbolic witnesses featuring
public key pkint with Sign. The knowledge of the internal
actor has now been fully expanded in the initial state of the
symbolic contract execution.
4.1.1 Cryptographic Extensions
It is possible to extend Σsetup (eq. 3) and Σexec (eq.4) to model
additional cryptographic sub-protocols useful for the con-
struction of contracts. We demonstrate such an extension
with the adaptor signature scheme, previously formalized
in [11]. An adaptor signature scheme consists of Ξadapt =
(pSign, pVrfy, Adapt, Ext) for a signature scheme Ξsig =
(Gen, Sign, Vrfy).
• pSign(tx′, inv(pk), pky) is a function that on input a mes-
sage tx′, private key inv(pk) and public key pky outputs
a pre-signature psigpk(tx′, pky)
• pVrfy(psigpk(tx′, pky), tx′, pk, pky) is a function that ver-
ifies a pre-signature against a message tx′ and public
keys pk and pky.
• Adapt(psigpk(tx′, pky), inv(pky) is a function that on in-
put a pre-signature psigpk(tx′, pky) and a private key
inv(pky) returns a signature sigpk(tx′).
• Ext(psigpk(tx′, pky),sigpk(tx′), pky) is a function that on
input a pre-signature, corresponding signature and public
key pky returns the a private key inv(pky).
Given pre-signature psigpk(tx′, pky), an observer can ex-
tract inv(pky) upon learning sigpk(tx′) with the function Ext.
Conversely, given psigpk(tx′, pky) and inv(pky), a valid signa-
ture sigpk(tx′) can be inferred.
Example 4.2 (Atomic Swap with Adaptor Signatures) In
the following example, our atomic swap contract has the hash-
lock in the swap spending paths replaced with pre-signatures
from Ξadapt . The pre-signatures are known by both actors but
not observable on-chain.
We adapt the output scripts for atomic swap transactions
from example 3.2 and replace the hash-lock in the swap
spending condition with a public key of the counterparty.
Expressed in Miniscript, the HTLC output scripts of tx f und,in
and tx f und,ex for our atomic swap contract initiated by the
internal actor are the following:
mint = andor(pkext , pkint ,
andv(v(pkint),older(15)))
mext = andor(pkint , pkext ,
andv(v(pkext),older(10)))
With the hash-lock removed, there are no on-chain transaction
semantics which reveal a coupling between the swap paths of
the two contract participants. Instead, this coupling is setup
during the user-defined setup protocol with an exchange of
pre-signatures between the actors.
Setup Phase: The user-defined setup phase now features
an extended public function set.
Σ′setup = {Gen,PK,Hash,genTx,pSign,pVrfy}
Note that GenTx must also generate swap transactions for
both actors, so that both actors can generate and verify pre-
signatures for swap transactions tx′swap,int , tx′swap,ext of the
counter-party. inv(pky) is generated by the initiating, inter-
nal actor and so inv(pky) /∈ Kext at setup. Once these pre-
signatures are validated, the setup protocol is complete. When
compared to the previously illustrated atomic swap contract
with hash-locks, the actor knowledge after contract setup
are extended by pre-signatures and related public keypairs
(inv(pky), pky).
Kint = {..., inv(pky),
psigpkext (tx
′
swap,int , pky), psigpkint (tx
′
swap,ext , pky)}
Kext = {..., pky,
psigpkint (tx
′
swap,ext , pky), psigpkext (tx
′
swap,int , pky)}
The set of public functions available to actors Σexec during
symbolic contract execution is extended with Adapt,Ext ∈
Ξadapt .
Σ′exec = {SweepTx,Sign,Adapt,Ext}
We only illustrate the contract state during symbolic execution
when both funding transactions are confirmed and no direct
messages have been exchanged yet. The initiating internal
actor wishes to execute its swap transaction: The spending
conditions for the swap path of output script mext require
sigpkint (tx
′
swap,int) and sigpkext (tx
′
swap,int), the latter which is
derived with the Adapt function.
Kint ` psigpkext (tx′swap,int , pky) Kint ` inv(pky)
Adapt
Kint ` sigpkext (tx′swap,int)
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Once txswap,int is executed, the external actor can observe
sigpkint(tx
′
swap,int) (publication proof), and derive inv(pky)
with the Ext function.
Kext ` psigpkext (tx′swap,int , pky) Kext ` sigpkext (tx′swap,int , pky)
Ext
Kext ` inv(pky)
The external actor can expand its knowledge with
adapt, the pre-signature and publication proof to obtain
sigpkext (tx
′
swap,ext , pky). This signature enables the external
actor to also execute its swap transaction, thereby completing
the contract.
Kext ` psigpkext (tx′swap,ext , pky) Kext ` inv(pky)
Adapt
Kext ` sigpkint (tx′swap,ext)
Note that without the shared hash-lock, the atomic swap
scheme with adaptor signature does not reveal any con-
tract coupling between swap transactions on the Bitcoin
blockchain: The atomic coin swap contract is now no longer
visible to the observer of the Bitcoin network.
4.1.2 Messages & Transaction Broadcasts
In addition to deducing information from existing knowl-
edge with public functions, actors can directly exchange mes-
sages to update the knowledge of the recipient. Furthermore, a
transaction broadcast by an actor which includes information
previously unknown to the counter-party also results in the
knowledge update of the observer.
Definition 4.2 (Fire-able Message Transition) A message
transition ea(k) with payload k is fire-able by an actor a ∈
{int,ext} with knowledge Ka, if k is known by the sender but
unknown to the recipient.
Definition 4.3 (Message Transition Firing) Let ea(k) be a
transition for actor knowledges (Ka,Kb), fire-able by actor
a ∈ {int,ext}. The firing of of ea(k) updates actor knowledge
(Ka,Kb) to (Ka,Kb∪{k})
Ka ` k Kb`k
Kb
ea(k)−−−→ Kb ∪ {k}
An actor knowledge can also be expanded with knowledge
observed on the blockchain. Specifically, an actor will expand
its knowledge when the counter-party broadcasts a transac-
tion on the network and the transaction includes previously
unknown input witness elements such as signatures or hash
pre-images.
A transaction broadcast is only fireable during the sym-
bolic execution of a contract if it leads to a knowledge update
of the observing actor. In order for an actor to fire a broad-
cast transition, it must be deducible by the initiating actor,
be consensus valid according to a blockchain model B, and
provide new information to the counterparty. A complete,
valid transaction can be deduced by an actor if can produce
a valid witness for each of its inputs: A valid witness stack
for an input must satisfy at least one of the symbolic wit-
nesses {Γ0,Γ1, ...}= sat(in). The deduction rule for an actor
to derive a valid transaction is shown below:
Ka ` tx′ ∀(in ∈ tx′.ins)∃(w,Γ)(Ka ` w∧w |= Γ∧Γ ∈ sat(in))
Ka ` tx
The actor must know the transaction template, and be able to
generate a valid witness w for each transaction template.
Definition 4.4 (Fire-able Transaction Broadcast) A trans-
action broadcast tb for a transaction is fire-able if it is de-
ducible by actor a ∈ {int,ext}, is valid in blockchain state B
and contains witness stack elements unknown to actor b.
Definition 4.5 (Transaction Broadcast Firing) The firing
of a transaction broadcast leads to an update of the observing
actors knowledge if it contains witness elements previously
unknown to the observer.
KB ` tx ∃wi(wi ∈ tba.ins∧Kb`wi) tx is valid in B
Kb
tba−−→ Kb ∪
⋃
wi∈tba.ins ∧ Kb` wi
{wi}
Witness elements of the broadcast transaction tx are denoted
as wi ∈ tba.ins in the firing rule shown above.
4.2 Trace-Net Blockchain Model
The Trace-Net blockchain model captures the on-chain state
of contract transactions. To this end, Trace-Net adopts a clas-
sic Petri Net skeleton to capture the state and fire-ability of
on-chain transitions based on the availability of unspent out-
puts and the current height of the Bitcoin blockchain.
There are four classical Petri-Net elements [49] adopted by
the Trace-Net: Places, tokens, arcs and on-chain transitions,
as shown in figure 3. Tokens can only exist in places. Each on-
chain transition is connected to at least one place with directed
arcs. Arcs pointing from a place to an on-chain transition
reflect transaction inputs and are denoted input arcs (p, t).
Arcs pointing to places represent transaction outputs and are
denoted output arcs (t, p). A given place p can only connect
to a single input and single output arc at most and represents
a transaction output.
When an on-chain transition fires, the input arcs of the
fired transition each consume a token from their connected
place. Simultaneously, each transition output arc will produce
a token to its connected place during firing, modeling the
consumption and production of unspent transaction outputs
on the blockchain during the execution of the contract pro-
tocol. The place marking function m(p) ∈ {0,1} returns the
number of tokens currently in a place p. We extend the Petri
Net formalism with time markings and earliest firing time
intervals to arrive at the definition of a Trace-Net.
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Definition 4.6 (Trace-Net) A Trace-Net Z is the tuple
(Kint0 ,K
ext
0 ,P,T,F, Iolder, Ia f ter,m0,b0) such that
1. Kint0 ,K
ext
0 is the initial actor knowledge.
2. There exists a p(out) ∈ P for each out ∈ Kin0 /Kex0 .
3. F is a relation F ⊆ (P×T )∪ (T ×P).
4. For all tx ∈ Kint/ext0 :
(a) There exists a unique t ∈ T for each pii of pi(tx).
(b) For each tx and in ∈ tx, (p(in.prevout), t) ∈ F .
(c) For each tx and out ∈ tx, (t, p(out)) ∈ F .
5. Ia f ter, Iolder : (P×T )→ N0
(a) Ia f ter(p, t), Ia f ter(p, t) |= t.pii for t ∈ T
6. m0 : P→{0,1} is the initial marking
7. b0 :→ N is the initial blockheight
(2) A place is added toZ for each output featured in the con-
tract transaction templates present in the initial actor knowl-
edge states. This includes outputs referenced by transaction
templates (funding outputs) and symbolic sweep transactions.
(3) F a relation representing input and output arcs. (4) Trace-
Net models a dedicated transition for each symbolic witness
permutation (definition 3.4) of a transaction: This enables the
fireability of each symbolic witness permutation to be mod-
eled separately (5) Earliest firing intervals is a function over
input arcs and must satisfy the symbolic witness permutation
associated with its transition. The firing intervals are implied
by the a f ter and older constraints expressed in the respective
symbolic witness.
Let us denote t− as the required token availability for t over
all places P in Trace-Net Z in order for t to be fireable. This
is illustrated in figure 3.
t(p)− =
{
1 i f (p, t) ∈ F
0 i f (p, t) 6∈ F
Similarly, we can denote (p, t)− as the required token avail-
ability for place p required by an input arc, which will trivially
be 1 for a connected place and 0 for a disconnected one.
Trace-Net Z models the possible on-chain contract trans-
actions and the possible states of unspent outputs throughout
the symbolic execution of the contract. However, in order to
model the contract state, we must also introduce a notion of
time to determine the expiration of time-locks.
Definition 4.7 (Time Markings) A function h∗ : (P×T )→
N0 is a time marking in Z.
Figure 3: Classical Petri Net components consist of places,
arcs, transitions and tokens. The classical Petri Net firing rule
denotes that a transition can only fire if its input arcs are
connected to places populated with tokens.
In order to express the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of
time constraints imposed by spending conditions featuring
(a f ter >= i) or (older > i) expressions, stateful time mark-
ings are applied to input arcs. For an on-chain transition to
be fire-able, all time markings must have released the respec-
tive on-chain transition. A time marking releases its input
arc when they reach or exceed their respective earliest firing
times.
1. holder(p, t)≥ Iolder(p, t))
2. ha f ter(p, t)≥ Ia f ter(p, t))
We can now define a contract state in the Trace-Net
framework. It consists of the state of actor knowledge, time
markings, place markings and on-chain history of confirmed
blockchain transactions. An example of a contract state is
depicted in figure 4, which represents the contract state of an
atomic swap initiated by the internal actor after the contract
has been unilaterally funded by the internal, verifying party.
Definition 4.8 (Trace-Net State) Let a state in Trace-Net Z
be the tuple z := (Kin,Kex,B) = (Kin,Kex,holder,ha f ter,m,q)
such that
1. For all (p, t) ∈ F :
(a) ((p, t)− < m)→ holder(p, t) = 0
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Figure 4: A Trace-Net model of an atomic swap initiated by the internal actor is shown. Input arc and transition markings are
overlayed on top of the Trace-Net skeleton. Transitions are annotated with the actors who can produce the corresponding valid
transaction witnesses from knowledge. The state shown above represents the contract state z imminently after the confirmation of
the internal actor’s funding transaction. Note the chain-height is 20 at time of evaluation, and that abort delays are set to 15 and
10 blocks respectively.
(b) ((p, t)− = m)→ holder(p, t) ∈ N0
(c) ha f ter(p, t)→ N
2. m is the current place marking
3. q is the current on-chain history
(1) The input arc time marking holder(p, t) can only begin to
increment when a symbolic unspent output becomes available.
ha f ter is always equal to the blockheight, as it only enforces a
global expiration time unrelated to output confirmation ages.
Definition 4.9 (On-chain history) The on-chain history at
a Trace-Net state is the history of the on-chain contract trans-
actions appended to the blockchain.
On-chain histories can be expressed as a list of tuples q =
{(t0,h0),(t1,h1), ...} ordered according to their position in
the blockchain, where hi represents the blockheight of the
transaction corresponding to ti.
Definition 4.10 (Time transition d) Let d be a non-zero nat-
ural number, and z a state in Z, then the elapsing of time d
will change state z into z′ such that
1. K′in,K′ex,m′ := Kin,Kex,m
2. h′older(p, t) :=
{
holder(p, t)+d i f f m≥ (p, t)−
0 i f f m 6≥ (p, t)−
3. h′a f ter := h
′
a f ter +d
Note that the holder(p, t) delay marking does not begin to
increment before the input place is populated with a token.
For an older marking for input arc (p, t) to release its on-
chain transition t, it must increment beyond an earliest firing
time Iolder(p, t), which in turn is determined by the presence
of an older time-lock in the associated output satisfaction
conditions given by t.pii, where pii is the witness permutation
associated with the on-chain transition t (definition 4.6). In
the absence of an older time-lock, Iolder(p, t) is set to 0. The
ha f ter(p, t) input arc time marking simply holds the value of
the chain height at the time of evaluation and is initiated to the
initial blockheight b0. It releases the on-chain transition at the
earliest firing time which is determined by the after time-lock
of the output its input arc is connected to. In absence of an
after time-lock, Ia f ter(p, t) is set to 0.
Definition 4.11 (Valid On-chain Transition) An on-chain
transition t is valid if
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1. m≥ t−
2. holder(p, t)≥ Iolder(p, t)) for all p ∈ P.(p, t) ∈ F
3. ha f ter(p, t)≥ Ia f ter(p, t) for all p ∈ P.(p, t) ∈ F
Definition 4.12 (Fire-able On-chain Transition) A transi-
tion t in Trace-Net state Z is ready to fire by an actor if
1. t is a valid on-chain transaction
2. tb for tx(t) is not fireable (definition: 4.5)
3. ∃actor(Kactor ` tx(t))
An on-chain transition t can fire if its pre-places are pop-
ulated, and all input arc time markings have released, and a
single or both actors can deduce valid witnesses for all inputs
from knowledge. A on-chain transition firing is proceeded
by a transaction broadcast (definition 4.5), if the broadcast
results in an update of an actor’s knowledge.
Definition 4.13 (On-chain transition firing) The firing of a
fire-able on-chain transition of t in Trace-Net Z changes the
state z into z′ = (Kin,Kex,holder,ha f ter,m′) where
1. m := m+∆ t
We denote ∆ t as change in the place markings of the Trace-
Net as a result of the on-chain transition firing.
Definition 4.14 (Chain roll-back transition firing) A roll-
back of a blockchain by n blocks by the adversarial external
actor at state z is always fireable. It reverts the transactions
in the on-chain chronology which were confirmed within n
blocks of the current height b and changes the contract state
z to z′ = (Kin,Kex,h′older,h
′
a f ter,m
′,q′) where
1. q′ has reverted all transactions in q which were con-
firmed in the rolled-back blocks.
2. m′−∑rev∆t, where rev is the set of reverted transactions
and ∆t the changes in place marking they effected.
3. h′a f ter :=
{
ha f ter−n i f ha f ter−n > 0
0 i f ha f ter−n≤ 0
4. holder(p, t)′ :=
{
holder(p, t)−n i f holder(p, t)−n > 0
0 i f ha f ter−n≤ 0
Note that the knowledge of the actors is not rolled back
during a roll-back transition firing, as the previously observed
and derived knowledge of an actor cannot be deleted by the
adversarial external actor. Once a roll-back is completed, it is
possible to model alternative chain branches created by the
51% attacker, who can generate any valid contract transaction
order in the new branch (section 5).
4.3 Trace-Net Generation
Algorithm 1 summarizes the generation of a Trace-Net from
a set of Bitcoin contract transaction templates in Kint,ext after
the completion of the implemented contract setup phase.
Algorithm 1 Trace-Net Generation
1: P,T,F := /0, /0, /0
2: Iolder, Ia f ter,m0 := {},{},{}
3: b0 := current blockheight
4:
5: for all tx′ ∈ Kin,ex do
6:
7: /* Generate places for all outputs and prevouts */
8: for all idx, in ∈ tx′. ~ins do
9: ~pin[idx] := place(in.prevout)
10: Add ~pin[idx] to P if ~pin[idx] /∈ P
11: m0( ~pin[idx]) = 1 if unspent on-chain
12: end for
13: for all idx,out ∈ tx′. ~outs do
14: ~pout [idx] := place(out)
15: Add ~pout [idx] to P if ~pout [idx] /∈ P
16: end for
17:
18: /* Generate permutations of pi(tx) over inputs */
19: 〈Γ¯〉 :=⋃in∈tx′.ins{sat(in)}
20: pi(tx) := product(〈Γ¯〉)
21:
22: /* Per permutation: Construct transition, arcs */
23: for all pii ∈ pi(tx) do
24: Add new t to T
25: for all idx, pin ∈ ~pin do
26: Add (pin, t) to F
27: Iolder(pin, t) := nolder, s.t. nolder |= pii
28: Ia f ter(pin, t) := na f ter, s.t. na f ter |= pii
29: end for
30: for all pout ∈ ~pout do
31: arcout := arc(t, pout)
32: Add arcout to F
33: end for
34: end for
35:
36: end for
To generate the Trace-Net Z in state z0, all transactions
in the contract are iterated through. Places are generated for
each in- and output in the contract (Lines 7-16). Subsequently,
a transaction is represented by one or more on-chain transi-
tion instances, each representing a unique symbolic witness
permutation: The product returns a cartesian product over all
sets of alternative symbolic witnesses Γ¯i for each ith input
(Lines 19, 20) and returns a set of symoblic witness permu-
tations pi(tx) = {pi0,pi1, ...}. A separate on-chain transition is
instantiated for each with the corresponding input arcs adopt-
15
ing earliest firing time values from the respective symbolic
witness constraints (Lines 27, 28).
5 Automated Trace-Net Analysis
Let Z be our Trace-Net and z0 = {Kin0 ,Kex0 ,holder,0 =
0,ha f ter,0 = b0,m0,q0 = /0} its initial state. We are interested
in generating the transition system or reachability graph RG
which expresses the total state space reachable by all pos-
sible contract executions. At each state z, the fireability of
messages, transaction broadcast, transaction confirmation and
blockchain roll-backs is evaluated, which in turn implies the
strategies of each actor in state z. We parameterize the gen-
eration of RG with two additional parameters: Confirmation
delays and maximum blockchain reorganization depth.
Confirmation delays The confirmation delay between on-
chain transaction broadcast and confirmation in a block is
denoted cint and cext respectively, where cint ,cext ∈ Z. Non-
zero confirmation delays imply that an on-chain transaction
fired by actor will always be preceded by a delay transition
of duration cint/ext .
Blockchain reorganizations We explicitly model the abil-
ity of the adversary to reorganize the blockchain up to a depth
of rmax ∈ Z when generating RG. At each Trace-Net state,
alternate blockchain reorganizations of all depths up to rmax
are generated. An adversarial reorganization can be described
as a r-depth roll-back (definition 4.14) transition from state z
to state zbr, followed by the generation of all possible contract
states reachable within r+ 1 blocks starting from zbr fire-
able by the external actor (Alg. 2, lines 26-33). Although not
explored in alg. 2, the chain heights from resulting reorgani-
zations can include heights which are larger than 1. On-chain
contract transitions fired by the external actor in the reorga-
nized branch do not need to be prepended with a confirmation
delay, as the external actor can directly append any valid trans-
action to any block in the reorganized chain, without having to
broadcast to the public network. A blockchain reorganization
from z to the reorganized state z′ is a single externally fireable
transition in the reachability graph: z
reorg−−−→ z′.
The resulting reachability graph RG(Z,zinit ,cint,ext ,rmax)=
(W,E) is a directed graph with the set of vertices W , and edges
E. It is necessarily finite, given the bounded knowledge ex-
pansion after each state transition and the finite number of
contract transactions. Figure 5 illustrates the partial reachabil-
ity graph of an atomic swap contract initiated by the external
actor. Algorithm 2 generates the contract state space reach-
able from an initial state z0 by recursively computing all child
states directly reachable via transitions fireable in each state.
The time delay transition is only fired if its firing results in an
expiration of time-locks, thereby releasing a contract trans-
action. The time-transition delay is chosen to be minimal, in
order to reflect the transaction execution order enforced by
contract time-locks.
Algorithm 2 Reachability Graph RG(Z,zinit ,cint,ext ,rmax)
1: W,E := {zinit} , /0
2: for all z ∈W do
3:
4: /* States reachable by on-chain transitions */
5: for all t fire-able in z do
6: Compute z′, z′′, z′′′ s.t. z
tb(t)→ z′ d(cint/ext )−−−−−→ z′′ t→ z′′′
7: Add z′, z′′, z′′ and to W
8: Add (z,(tb),z′), (z′,(d),z′′) ,(z′′,(t),z′′′) to E
9: end for
10:
11: /* States reachable by message transitions */
12: for all e fire-able in z do
13: Compute z′ such that z e→ z′
14: Add z′ and (z,(e),z′) to W,E
15: end for
16:
17: /* Timelock expiration(s) reachable with delays */
18: for all t fire-able in z after min. delay d do
19: Compute z′ such that z d→ z′
20: Add z′ and (z,(d),z′) to W,E
21: end for
22:
23: /* States reachable with chain reorganization(s) */
24: for all dep in [1 : rmax] do
25: Wr := /0
26: Compute zbr s.t. z
r(dep)−−−→ zbr
27: Add zbr to Wr
28: for all zr in Wr do
29: for all fireable text /d in zr s.t. h(z′r)≤ h(z)+1 do
30: Compute z′r such that zr
d−→ tbext−−→ text−−→ z′r
31: Add z′r to Wr, Del zr from Wr
32: end for
33: end for
34: W :=W ∪Wr
35: for all zr in Wr do
36: add (z,reorg,zr) to E
37: end for
38: end for
39:
40: end for
Feasible termination trace A feasible termination trace
σ will traverse the reachability graph RG(Z,z0,cint,ext ,rmax)
from z0 until a terminal state zn is reached, where no further
transitions can be fired.
σ= z0
θ0→ z1...zn−1 θn−1→ zn
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Figure 5: A partial reachability graph for our atomic-swap contract example is shown above which has been generated with
transaction confirmation delays and reorganization depths set to zero for simplicity. The contract is being evaluated for its initial
state z0, before any funding transaction has been executed. Each contract execution trace shown is denoted with the outcome of
its execution.
The finite reachability graph allows an exhaustive analysis
of all feasible contract traces. The types of transitions and
firing actors can be analyzed to infer temporal contract safety
properties of interest.
6 Contract Safety Properties
We can now formalize the notion of trustless contract execu-
tion, which implies that the verifying actor can always safely
terminate the contract execution despite any adversarial strate-
gies pursued by the external actor.
6.1 Trustless Execution Property
(i) Safe Terminal States The safety of terminal states in a
reachability graph RG(Z,zinit , ..) are determined by a user-
supplied safety policy function policy(Kint,ext ,m), and there-
fore depends on the actor knowledge state and output mark-
ings at the terminal state in question. Actor knowledge states
can imply information leaked to the counter-party, and place
markings infer the balance owned by the internal actor. For
our atomic swap example, we could suggest a policy func-
tion which ensures that in a safe terminal state, the internal
actor must obtain a balance equal to the amount used to fund
the contract, thereby ensuring that only terminal states of the
abort and success paths are considered safe.
(ii) (Un)cooperative Termination Trace An execution
trace σint in RG beginning at a state zinit which leads to a
safe terminal state within finite transitions fired by a single
actor is an uncooperative termination trace. The presence of
internally fireable, uncooperative traces from contract state z
implies that the verifying actor can reach a safe terminal state
if the external actor ceases to participate in the contract proto-
col. A collaborative termination trace is a contract execution
trace which includes transitions fired by both actors.
(iii) Safe Non-terminal States
1. A safe non-terminal state zs in RG features at least one
uncooperative termination trace σint fireable by the veri-
fying actor.
2. If the external actor can fire any on-chain transition text
in z along σint , then the resulting state z′ computed from
z t
ext→ z′ must also be a safe state.
(iv) Safe Termination Trace If all intermediary states
along a (un)cooperative termination trace σint/ext are safe
for the verifying internal actor, then the trace is considered
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safe, as the verifying actor is guaranteed to have an execution
path to safe termination, despite any adversarial strategies
pursued by the actor.
Definition 6.1 (Trustless Execution Property) The con-
tract execution from a state zinit exhibits the trustless exe-
cution property if there exists at least one safe cooperative
trace beginning at zinit .
6.2 Analysis of Contract Updates
A contract update can occur whilst a contract is not yet termi-
nated. This implies the execution of an additional setup phase
and new transaction templates being added the current actor
knowledge Kint ,Kext ,RG
update−−−−→ K′int ,K′ext ,RG′, from which
an updated Trace-Net and reachability graph RG′ are gen-
erated. If RG′ features additional, safely reachable terminal
states the contract update is safe, as it increases the contract-
state space with additional safe termination traces.
6.3 Contract State Stability
A contract state z is stable if
RG(Z,z,cint,ext ,rmax) = RG(Z,z′,cint,ext ,rmax) (5)
where z ∞→ z′ and ∞ is a delay of infinite duration. This
implies that the execution of the contract can be deferred
indefinitely. Both the analysis of contract updates and ver-
ification of the state stability property can be useful in the
analysis of off-chain protocols, which defer transaction broad-
casts so that contract updates can be performed off-chain.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a novel method to automate the verifi-
cation of multi-party Bitcoin contract protocols at the raw
contract transactions level. The main advantages of contract
verification at the implementation level is the ability to verify
a contract at run-time and to accurately model the underly-
ing blockchain execution environment, which may include
confirmation delays and possible chain reorganizations. Fur-
thermore, Trace-Net can be useful as an effective monitoring
framework for contract protocol implementations.
The main components of our framework consist of a state-
ful actor knowledge model and an extended Petri Net model
which captures the semantics of on-chain contract output avail-
ability and time-locks. Together, these two components deter-
mine which strategies are available to contracting participants
in all contract protocol states. Furthermore, we have demon-
strated the extension of Trace-Net actor knowledge model
with adaptor signatures in section 4.1.1, thereby extending
Trace-Net verification to contracts which can be executed
privately.
The instantiation of Trace-Net was illustrated with atomic
swaps and we emphasize that Trace-Net semantics are suffi-
ciently expressive for more complex protocols such as pay-
ment channel networks [10] or generalized state-channels
[11]. Trace-Net lends itself to further investigations, includ-
ing methods to efficiently represent the unfolded state-space
in which the verification is performed, as the state-space ex-
plosion problem remains untreated. Proposals [50] [8] have
been made to extend Bitcoin script, providing Turing-machine
expressiveness, which would be a valuable future area of re-
search for Trace-Net. Furthermore, domain-specific contract
specification languages can be investigated which compile to
Trace-Net models as an intermediate representation, whilst
providing inherent contract safety and liveness guarantees.
We intend to develop research tooling to explore the verifica-
tion of Trace-Net models with time-proven model-checking
frameworks.
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